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Abrams: The Civil RICO Controversy Reaches the Supreme Court

ARTICLE

THE CIVIL RICO CONTROVERSY REACHES
THE SUPREME COURT
Gary S. Abrams*
In recent years, no statute, except perhaps the Civil Rights Act
of 1871,1 has engendered as much controversy, discussion, and litiga-

tion as the statutory provision that authorizes private civil damage
suits for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).' Since 1978 the federal courts have published

more than 100 decisions involving civil RICO,3 and have offered almost as many interpretations of its provisions. The controversy surrounding civil RICO was heightened as a result of three decisions
handed down by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on successive
days at the end of July 1984. 4 The effect of these three decisions, at
*B.S., 1980, Boston University; J.D., 1983, Antioch School of Law. The author is associated with the law firm of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel, New York, N.Y., and served as Law
Clerk to Hon. George C. Pratt, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 198385. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author. The author would like to
thank Maureen Dolan and Janet Aspen for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1982)). Section 1983 has been described as being "at the center of federal statutory, as
well as constitutional, jurisprudence." Wartelle & Louden, Private Enforcement of Federal
Statutes: The Role of Section 1983 Remedy, 9 HAsTINGs CONST. L.Q. 487, 488 (1982). Over
30,000 § 1983 suits were filed in 1981. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 533 n.20
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1982), was enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C. (1982)). This Article will focus on the private civil remedies under the Act, which are
contained in § 1964(c).
3. Siegel, "RICO" Running Amok in Board Rooms, L.A. Times, February 15, 1984, at
1.
4. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) (decided July 25), rev'd,
105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984) (decided
July 26), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524 (2d
Cir. 1984) (decided July 27), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550
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least in the Second Circuit, was to severely curtail the reach of the
civil RICO statute by drastically limiting a private plaintiff's ability
to pursue a claim under its provisions. The Seventh Circuit then
handed down a decision in Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank
& Trust Co.,5 which rejected the conclusions reached by Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,' the controlling decision in the Second Circuit. As a result of the various approaches to civil RICO taken by
the lower courts and the importance of the issues involved, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Haroco and Sedima.
On July 1, 1985, the Supreme Court issued a decision in
Sedima 7 which categorically rejected the attempts of the Second
Circuit to curtail the statute's reach. The Court found no support in
either the statute's language or its legislative history for the conclusions reached by the court below. In Sedima, the Court sanctioned a
broad reading of the statute's provisions which has the potential for
revolutionizing civil litigation throughout the federal court system.
This Article begins by briefly reviewing the civil RICO statute,
its legislative history, and some of the judicial interpretation of its
provisions. It then analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima
and offers suggestions for alternative methods of limiting the scope
of this controversial statute.
I. BACKGROUND
Enacted as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of
(1985).
The Second Circuit held in Sedima that "prior criminal conviction is a prerequisite to a
civil RICO action." 741 F.2d at 496. The court further held that a plaintiff must demonstrate
a racketeering injury in order to maintain a civil RICO claim, Id. Bankers Trust also held

that a plaintiff must demonstrate a racketeering injury in order to maintain a civil RICO
action, but offered a somewhat different "definition" of what constitutes such an injury. 741
F.2d at 516. The Bankers Trust panel did not reach the criminal conviction issue because it

was not necessary to the disposition of the case. The Furman panel concluded that neither the
language nor the legislative history of the statute support a racketeering enterprise injury re-

quirement, but the panel affirmed the dismissal of a civil RICO claim by the district court
based on the controlling precedents of Sedima and Bankers Trust. The Furman opinion ex-

plained that, by agreement of the court, the three decisions were filed in the order in which
they were completed, and that it published its opinion to express its disagreement with the
views of the other two panels. An internal court request for en banc consideration of the three
cases was denied, prior to the opinions being filed, by a vote of 6-3. Id.
5. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).

6. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984).
7.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985). The Court also affirmed the

Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105
S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
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1970,8 RICO9 was designed to provide additional criminal and civil

remedies 0 to deal with the growing influence of organized crime because existing remedies and sanctions were found to be inadequate in
controlling its growth."1
The inauspicious origins of what has become known as "civil
RICO" are well-documented. 12 The private right of action contained
in section 1964(c) was added to the original Senate bill' 3 by a House
8. See supra note 2.
9. The statute's name and the acronym it generated have been the subject of speculation
regarding whether it was actually named after the character played by Edward G. Robinson in
"Little Ceasar," who was named "RICO." See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities Inc., 548 F.
Supp. 20, 21 n.1 (N.D. I11.1982); Blakey, The RICO Civil FraudAction in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 237 n.3 (1982). Professor Blakey was chief
counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 1969-70 when the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941, was "processed,"
and has written extensively on the subject of RICO. See Bridges, Private RICO Litigation
Based Upon "Fraudin the Sale of Securities," 18 GA. L. REv. 43, 45-46 n.20 (1983). Although Professor Blakey has helped fuel this speculation, he will neither confirm nor deny that
this was the origin of the name. See Blakey, at 237 n.3.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) is the substantive RICO provision. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 defines the criminal penalties for violations of the substantive provisions, and 18 U.S.C. § 1964
(1982) defines the civil remedies. See Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009,
1021 n.71 (1980).
11. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922,
923 (Statements of Findings and Purpose); S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78
(1969). See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1013 n.15.
12. See, e.g., Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3277 n.1; Blakey, supra note 9, at 249-80;
Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at 1017-21.
13. In 1969 Senator McClellan introduced the original Senate Bill, S. 30, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 769 (1969), and later that year Senator Hruska introduced S. 1623,
entitled "Criminal Activities Profits Act," which included a provision for private equitable
relief and private treble damages actions. 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969). Senate 1623 was a
redraft of two bills previously introduced by Senator Hruska, S. 2048 and S. 2049, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 113 CONG. REC. 18,007 (1967), which were proposed as amendments to the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). Congress
did not act on either of these bills, in large part because the Antitrust Section of the American
Bar Association recommended that the proposals be enacted into separate statutes. Otherwise,
private plaintiffs suing under RICO's civil provisions would have been subjected to restrictive
standing and causation requirements "appropriate in a purely antitrust context." 115 CONG.
REc. 6995 (1969).
Still later in 1969, the two Senators jointly introduced S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115
CONG. REC. 9568-71 (1969), entitled "The Corrupt Organizations Act" of 1969, which did
not provide for a private right of action. On December 18, 1969, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out S. 30, the Organized Crime Control Act, amended to incorporate S. 1861
as Title IX. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 836 (1969). The list of racketeering activities in Title IX was expanded to include mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C.
§ 1343), and securities fraud, as well as bankruptcy fraud (from S. 1623). See Blakey, supra
note 9, at 268; S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1969).
As reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee, S. 30 did not provide for private
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subcommittee. 14 The legislative history accompanying this provision
is meager. Representative Steiger, who introduced the amendment,

said it would give private persons "access to a legal remedy [to] enhance the effectiveness of Title IX's prohibitions." 15 Representative
Poff echoed these sentiments, and stated that this provision was "another example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against

organized criminality." 6 None of the bill's proponents offered any
comments indicating that the scope of the private civil damages
would or should be limited in any way.' 7 Interestingly enough, Representative Mikva,' 8 an opponent of the bill, offered an amendment
providing for treble damages to defendants who had been subjected
treble damages or injunctive actions. Professor Blakey asserts that the bill explicitly did not
contain such a provision "in an effort to streamline it and sidestep a variety of complex legal
issues, as well as possible political problems in trying to process legislation that expressly created a variety of both public and private remedies." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 10, at
1017-18. Senate 30 was passed by a vote of 73 to 1. 116 CONG. REc. 972 (1970).
14. H.R. 19215, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REc. 31,914, and H.R. 19586, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 35,242 (1970), both contained private treble damages provisions; they otherwise paralleled the RICO sections contained in S. 30. See supra note 13. H.R.
19215 explicitly provided more complete remedial relief, including private injunctive relief and
governmental damage actions. The language finally enacted into law as § 1964(c) is identical
to that contained in H.R. 19586. See H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted
In 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4010. See also Blakey & Gettings, supra note
10, at 1014-21. With the exception of the private treble damages remedy, all of the House
amendments to S. 30 limited its scope. Id.
15. Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Relating to the Control of Organized
Crime in the United States, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 520 (1970) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
16. 116 CONG. REc. 35,295 (1970). See House Hearings,supra note 15, at 543-44 (testimony of Edward L. Wright, ABA president). See also 115 CONG. REc. 6993 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Hruska). The language of the private treble damages provision was borrowed
from § 4 of the Clayton Act. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982)).
17. The Second Circuit's position in Sedima regarding the legislative history of civil
RICO seemed to be that the paucity of discussion of the private treble damages remedy leads
to the "evident conclusion" that "Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492. This was a novel approach to the analysis of legislative history, and provoked a storm of criticism. See Flaherty, A RICO Crisis, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
13, 1984, at 30-31, col. 1. An equally plausible view is that this "clanging silence" demonstrated that the "silent majority" not only understood what the statutory language clearly
permitted but that it agreed wholeheartedly with its potential scope and effect. See Haroco,
Inc., v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S.
Ct. 3550 (1985). It is far from "evident," and probably incorrect, that Congress' "silence"
means it did not intend "to provide a federal forum for so many common law wrongs,"
Sedlma, 741 F.2d at 492, when those "wrongs" are clearly delineated in the statutory scheme
as a basis for civil liability. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.13.
18. Representative Mikva is now a Judge of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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to frivolous actions under section 1964(c).Y9 The amendment was
quickly defeated. 0
The revised version of the Senate bill was passed overwhelmingly by the House, 2 concurred in without a conference by the Senate,22 and signed by the President on October 15, 1970.23
II.

STATUTORY LANGUAGE

To determine the scope of any statute, the appropriate starting
point is its language. If unambiguous, the statute's language controls
interpretation, absent "a clearly expressed legislative intent to the
24
contrary."
The language of section 1964(c) provides:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of Section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the
damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
25
attorney's fee.
Under section 1962, it is unlawful
(a) .. .for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity . . . to
19. 116 CONG. REC. 35, 342-43 (1970).
20. Id. at 35,343. Judge Oakes acknowledged in Sedima that "[t]he evident purpose of
this amendment which was quickly defeated ... was to point out the dangerous overbreadth
of the section." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 490 n.22 (citation omitted). Unfortunately, he dismissed
this evidence that the issue was brought to the attention of the House but the House nevertheless rejected the proposed amendment: "We decline to infer from Representative Mikva's comments the conclusion that Congress intended to promulgate a statute as broad as the one he
feared it was passing. Deriving legislative intent from a dissenting congressman's 'parade of
horrors' speeches in opposition is a notoriously dubious practice." Id.
Regardless of any comments made by Representative Mikva, the fact that the House
defeated this amendment without discussion indicates not only that it was on notice of the
possible scope of this so-called "dangerous tool," but that it quickly rejected any attempts to
limit it. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,342-43 (1970). See also Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.13 ("§
1964(c) did not pass through Congress unnoticed").
21. Rep. Steiger withdrew a number of last minute amendments he had previously offered. 116 CONG. Rac. 35,346-47.
The House passed the bill by a vote of 341-26. 116 CONG. REc. 35,363 (1970).
22. Id. at 36,296 (1970).
23. Id. at 37,264 (1970).
24. Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296, 299 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981), quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). Both Russello and Turkette involved interpretations of
different RICO provisions, § 1963 (a)(1) and § 1961(4) respectively. See infra text accompanying notes 146-56.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:147

use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce ...
(b) . . .for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
. ..to acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any

enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) .. .for any person employed by or associated with any enter-

prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
(d) . ..for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions

of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section. 6

Thus, in order to state a claim under section 1964(c), a plaintiff
must allege injury to his business or property by reason of defendant's investing in, maintaining an interest in, or participating in an
enterprise 27 through a pattern of racketeering activity.2"
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
27. An "enterprise" is defined as including "any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). An enterprise encompasses both
legitimate and illegitimate entities. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
28. A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). "Racketeering activity" under § 1961(1) means:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable
under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any
act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United
States Code: Sections 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to
theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious,
section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections
891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to
transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section
1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating
to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia),
section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to
prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C)
any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing
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On its face, this statutory language appears unambiguous.2 9 In

light of the absence of any detailed legislative history concerning this
provision, its language should control its interpretation." Nevertheless, some courts, concerned that this "broad" language would allow
treble damage recovery for an endless variety of claims, 31 attempted
with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c)
(relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud
connected with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious
manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United
States;
18 U.S.C. § 1962(1) (1982). Some courts have equated a pattern of racketeering activity with
two separate acts of racketeering activity occurring within the required time period. See
Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486; Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 17 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984). Yet under § 1961(5), a pattern of racketeering activity "requires at least two acts of racketeering activity." (emphasis added). The use of the words
"requires at least" indicates that something above and beyond the two acts of racketeering
activity is required in order to show a "pattern," i.e., the two acts must be somehow related so
that they form a pattern, and are not a series of isolated, disconnected acts. S. REP. No. 617,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969) ("continuity plus relationship"). 116 CONG. REc. 18,940
(1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14; id. at 3289-90
(Powell, J., dissenting). Th6 Supreme Court intimated that one way to limit the scope of civil
RICO would be to read "pattern" narrowly. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3285 n.14.
29. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286 (quoting Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984), affid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985)).
30. This is especially so in light of Congress' stipulation that RICO's provisions "shall
be liberally construed" to effectuate its remedial purposes. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970). See Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3283 n.10.
31. RICO has been described as the ultimate weapon in business litigation. ABA, Division of Professional Education, RICO: The Ultimate Weapon in Business and Commercial
Litigation (1983) (seminar materials). See also Skinner & Tone, Civil RICO and the Corporate Defendant, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 30, 1984, at 22, col. 3. Its potentially "broad" application is
perhaps best illustrated by the inclusion of mail and wire fraud as predicate acts under §
1961(1). These statutes, which stand in pari materia, have been broadly construed. See, e.g.,
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293-94 (Marshall J., dissenting); United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d
777, 791 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting); United States v. Siegel, 717 F.2d 9, 24 (2d
Cir. 1983) (Winter J., dissenting). Alone, the mail and wire fraud statutes do not provide a
private cause of action. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. See Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d
1170, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1979). See also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety
of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1101, 1104 (1982). Prior to RICO, fraud victims
were relegated to traditional common law remedies. With the enactment of RICO, a growing
number of plaintiffs have chosen to pursue civil RICO claims in federal court alleging mail
and wire fraud as predicate acts, thus transforming "ordinary" fraud claims into federal treble
damage actions. See, e.g., Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 409
(8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d
524, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550
(1985); Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484-85; Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1062 (8th Cir. 1982),
aft'd on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
Indeed, prior to 1985, 77% of all civil RICO cases at the trial court level involved securities, mail or wire fraud in a commercial setting. Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task
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to curtail the statute's scope. In response to the recent explosion of

civil RICO litigation3 2 these courts had imposed various artificial restrictions on a plaintiff's ability to bring a civil RICO claim.
III.

JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT CIVIL RICO

The means most often used by lower federal courts to restrict
civil RICO were (1) requiring an organized crime connection; (2)
limiting standing to persons suffering a competitive or commercial
injury; and (3) limiting standing to those persons suffering a "racketeering enterprise injury."
A.

Organized Crime Connection

Although RICO was enacted in response to the enormous problem of organized crime in the United States,3 3 Congress declined to

so limit its scope.3 4 While the requirement of a nexus to organized
crime initially found favor with a number of district courts, 5 circuit
courts that considered the issue declined to impose such a burden on
civil RICO plaintiffs.3
Force, 1985 A.B.A. SEc. CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW 55 [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Re-

port]. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3277 n.1.
32. Only two opinions dealing with civil RICO were published as of 1978. By 1981, the
number had only increased to thirteen. Now over 100 decisions have been published. Sedima,
741 F.2d at 486. See also Flaherty, supra note 17, at 30, col. 1. Judge Oakes, in Sedima,
speculated that the marked increase in civil RICO litigation over the past three or four years
was at least partly attributable to the widely cited article coauthored by Blakey and Gettings
which argued for a broad reading of the statute. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 486. This seems quite
plausible considering Professor Blakey's role in drafting RICO, the persuasive arguments contained in the article, and the RICO "cottage industry" which quickly developed following its
publication. See id.
33. See supra note 11.
34. Congress explicitly declined to limit RICO to the activities of the "Mafia" or "La
Cosa Nostra." 116 CONG. REC. 35,344-46 (1970). See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. 3288-89 (Powell,
J., dissenting). In addition, the predicate acts of racketeering activity contained in § 1961(1)
are in no way limited to conduct engaged in primarily by members of "organized crime." See
supra note 28. Senator McClellan, one of the sponsors of RICO, acknowledged that the Senate report did not claim "that the listed offenses are committed primarily by members of
organized crime, only that those offenses are characteristic of organized crime." McClellan,
The Organized Crime Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 55, 142 (1970) (emphasis in original). See also 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (remarks

of Rep. Poff) (RICO not limited to the operation of organized crime); House Hearings,supra
note 15, at 129, 689; Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719-20 (D.D.C. 1983).
35. See, eg., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983);
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981);
Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
36. See, e.g., Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1167 (5th
Cir. 1984); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 1280 (1984); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct.
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The primary reasons given for rejecting such a requirement are

that (1) it is contrary to the statute's language,37 and (2) since the
concept of organized crime is difficult to define, any attempts to impose such a requirement might create an offense based on status or
association, rendering the statute unconstitutional.3 8 Moreover, since
Congress explicitly chose not to limit RICO's application to organized crime, judicial attempts to impose limitations based on an organized crime requirement clearly contravene expressed Congressional intent.
B.

"Competitive" or "Commercial" Injury

Courts have also attempted to limit civil RICO by restricting
standing to sue solely to persons who have suffered an antitrust-type

"competitive" or "commercial" injury.3 9 The imposition of antitrust

508 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982), affid on rehearing,710
F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
37. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 1280 (1984); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
38. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,343-44 (remarks of Reps. Biaggi and Pofi); 116 CONG.
REC. 35,204 (remarks.of Rep. Poff). See also Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 491
(E.D. Pa. 1983); McClellan, supra note 34, at 62. The concept of "organized crime" itself is
elusive. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970) (Rep. Poff remarking that organized crime is not
"a precise and operative legal concept"); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 12, at 1013 n.15. See
Note, 95 HARV. L. REV., supra note 31, at 1107-09. See also Kimmel, 565 F. Supp. at 492. It
is far better to limit RICO's application to "organized illegal activity," as defined by the terms
of the statute, without regard to the nature of the "enterprise" involved or to the characteristics of those "infiltrating" it. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586-87 (1981)
(RICO applies to both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises).
Moreover, the addition of bankruptcy, mail, wire, and securities fraud to the list of predicate acts contained in § 1961(1) would seem to preclude an interpretation of RICO that limits
its application to the "Mafia" and its various satellite operations. These offenses generally fall
under the rubric of "white collar" or "commercial" crime and the perpetrators are generally
persons who occupy trusted positions in government and business. See Blakey, supra note 9, at
341-45 nn.223-35. See also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922, 923 (Statement of Findings and Purpose). From this, it would seem that Congress
cast a wide net to reach all kinds of organized criminal activity. See Furman v. Cirrito, 747
F.2d 524, 529-30 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S. Ct.
3550 (1985).
39. See e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), afrd sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated
and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal.
1982); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("competitive injury"); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982)
("commercial injury"). Fanslow and Bankers Trust imposed a strict competitive injury
requirement.
Bankers Trust was affirmed by the Second Circuit, although on a different ground, and
the court explicitly rejected the competitive injury requirement. 741 F.2d at 516 n.6. Van
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"standing" requirements on RICO plaintiffs is premised on the fact
that one of RICO's purposes is to prevent interference with free
competition, 40 and also on the similarities in language and remedies
in section 1964(c) and in section 4 of the Clayton Act. 1
While it is true that RICO is concerned with protecting legitimate businesses from competitors who are subsidized by organized
crime, and the language of section 4 of the Clayton Act parallels
that of section 1964(c), "[this does not mean . . . that RICO
42

should be viewed as an extension of antitrust law in all respects."
In other words, although RICO remedies are patterned after antitrust remedies, there is little evidence that section 1964(c) also imported the restrictive "competitive injury" requirement applicable in
an antitrust context.
Because the objectives of RICO and the antitrust laws are not
"coterminous," antitrust concepts are not relevant to RICO. 3 Antitrust law is designed to increase competition and efficiency in the
marketplace," and antitrust standing has been strictly limited to
avoid ruining violators and thereby reducing competition. 5 The
RICO statute, on the other hand, is aimed at inflicting financial injury on those who operate an enterprise through a pattern of rackeSchalck construed § 1964 to require an allegation of "business injury," which the court apparently defined as the same kind of competitive injury. 535 F. Supp. at 1136-37. Johnsen construed the term "racketeering enterprise injury" to mean commercial injury. 551 F. Supp. at
285. For the purpose of this discussion commercial and competitive injuries will be treated in

the same manner.
40. North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Ill. 1980);
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (Statement of Findings and Purpose).
41. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in pertinent part that "any person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-trust laws
may sue . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee." Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982)).
42. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), affd on rehearing,710 F.2d
1361 (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983). See H.R. REP.No.1549, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 57, reprinted in 1970 US. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4033; Note, supra note 31,
at 1111 ("the objectives [of RICO] transcend those of antitrust law").
43. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), af'd on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361
(en banc), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 527 (1983).
44. See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1977);
Sedlma, 741 F.2d at 496 n.41; Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 508 (1983).
45. Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 532 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub
nom, Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S.Ct. 3550 (1985); Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
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teering activity. 46 Civil RICO "is designed to ruin those individuals

and enterprises it is aimed at," not to "increase their efficiency or
protect them from insolvency." 47 Restricting RICO standing based
on antitrust principles defeats the basic purposes the statute is
designed to serve. Moreover, this restriction would deny standing to
individuals who suffer a direct, "non-competitive" injury "by reason
of" a section 1962 violation - e.g., customers, shareholders, or creditors of an enterprise - a result surely not intended by Congress,
whose concerns "extended much farther" than infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime and the resulting harm to com-

petition in the marketplace. 48 For these reasons, most courts that
considered the issue,49 correctly declined to limit RICO standing to
those suffering a "commercial" or "competitive" injury.
C. Racketeering Enterprise Injury
A greater number of courts have construed RICO to require a
"racketeering enterprise injury." 0 This concept also stems from antitrust principles, although here courts have simply based the racketeering enterprise injury concept on analogies to antitrust principles,
again based on the similar language contained in section 4 of the
Clayton Act and section 1964(c).51
46. Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982), affd on rehearing,710 F.2d
1361 (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Note, supra note 31, at 1112-13.
47. Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (emphasis in original). See also Furman, 741 F.2d at 532.
48. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
affid, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985). See In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1431-34 (E.D. Pa.
1984); Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Indus. Mach. Corp., 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1157
(D.N.J. 1983), af'd in part and revd in part on other grounds, 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1179 (1985).
49. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (2d Cir. 1984),
vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985); Sedima, 741 F.2d at 493 n.35; Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Bennett v. Berg,
685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), affd on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361 (en bane), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 527 (1983).
50. E.g., King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Guerrero v.
Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285-86 (C.D.
Cal. 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb, Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206,
208-09 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
51. Courts consistently intertwine the concepts of racketeering enterprise injury, competitive injury, and commercial injury, using the terms interchangeably when in fact they are
conceptually distinct. As a result, courts have blurred the analytical lines between the concepts. For example, while competitive injury seems definitionally clear, because it emanates
directly out of antitrust principles, commercial injury is more vague. Compare Van Schaick v.
Church of Scientology, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1137 (D. Mass. 1982) (commercial injury as "busi-

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:147

These courts required plaintiffs to show a "distinct RICO injury," characterized as an injury of the type RICO "was intended to
prevent. '52 Nevertheless, the district courts that adopted this requirement failed to articulate what must be alleged or proved in order to demonstrate a racketeering enterprise injury. At best, these
courts suggested that this type of injury was "something more" than
injury from the predicate acts, reasoning that Congress could not
have intended to provide an additional remedy for already compensable wrongs.5
ness injury") with Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (commercial
injury as "racketeering enterprise injury"). Racketeering enterprise injury is even more nebulous. While it overlaps with competitive injury, it is not necessarily identical. See Landmark
Say. & Loan v. Loeb, Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. Mich.
1981). It is "something more" than injury from the predicate acts, but what that is remains
unclear. See In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434-36 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
52. The term "racketeering enterprise injury" was apparently coined by the court in
Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb, Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D.
Mich. 1981). See Note, Civil RICO and "Garden Variety Fraud" - A Suggested Analysis,
58 ST. JOHN'S L. RaV. 93, 106 (1983). The Landmark court, while recognizing that the concept of "competitive injury" was not directly transferable from antitrust law to RICO, nevertheless based its racketeering enterprise injury requirement on an analogy to § 4 of the Clayton Act. Just as an antitrust plaintiff must show antitrust injury, the Landmark court
reasoned, so too must RICO plaintiffs allege a "RICO" injury, which the court characterized
as "racketeering enterprise injury." 527 F. Supp. at 208. The racketeering enterprise injury
was later defined as "injury of the type the RICO statute was intended to prevent." Harper v.
New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982). See Guerrero v.
Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D.D.C. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 564
F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. Mich. 1983). While this analogy is grounded on the fact that both
statutes compensate injury "by reason of" a prohibited activity, the use of those words is by no
means unique to these two statutes. For example, a WESTLAW search reveals that the words
"by reason" (the word "of" cannot be searched) are found in more than 2,600 sections of the
United States Code,
53. See, e.g., King v. Lasher, 572 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Guerrero v.
Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718-19 (D.D.C. 1983); Johnsen v. Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285
(C.D. Cal. 1982).
The courts that required a racketeering enterprise injury to be something more than injury from the predicate acts confused what is necessary to establish a RICO violation with the
injury that results from such a violation. A civil RICO claim by definition consists of something more than a claim under the predicate acts. Section 1962 prohibits a "pattern" of racketeering activity, which is more than isolated predicate acts. See supra note 28. A RICO plaintiff must prove the existence of an enterprise, which is a separate and distinct element from the
pattern of racketeering activity. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981);
Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), affld on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361 (en bane),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983). The plaintiff must also prove that the enterprise engaged
in a pattern of racketeering activity, which includes, but is not necessarily defined by, at least
two predicate acts. See supra note 28.
On the other hand, the only direct injuries that normally result from a RICO violation are
caused exclusively by the predicate acts of racketeering activity. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at
3288-89; In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434 (E.D. Pa. 1984). The enterprise is simply
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Most courts declined to impose such a requirement," essentially
because it has no support in the statute's language or legislative history. They viewed the concept of a racketeering enterprise injury as
an artificial judicial gloss - imposed on an otherwise clearly defined
statutory scheme - arising more from "judicial discomfort with the
broad sweep of RICO," 55 than from traditional methods of statutory
analysis,

IV.

THE SECOND CIRCUIT SPEAKS

In July 1984 three separate panels of the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals issued opinions outlining their views on the scope of civil
RICO. After the dust had settled, one commentator noted that the
Second Circuit had "pulled the plug on much of the rising tide" of
civil RICO litigation. 8 The facts of these three cases, 57 and their
respective holdings, are relevant to an understanding of the issues
leading to the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima.
the means by which these acts are carried out. The fact that the unlawful acts are perpetrated
as part of an "enterprise" enhances the actor's ability to cause injury and increases both the
nature and the extent of any potential injury, thus justifying an award of treble damages. So

understood, injury caused by an enterprise engaging in racketeering activity is precisely the
type of injury that RICO "was intended to prevent." This is so regardless of whether the
injury results directly from the predicate acts or indirectly when an enterprise acquires in-

creased market power as a result of the racketeering activity. As a result, a "racketeering
enterprise injury" is not necessarily "something more"; it is merely any injury "by reason of" a
§ 1962 violation. Any other definition would mean that RICO covers only indirect injuries,
over and above any direct injuries as a result of the underlying racketeering activity. This
simply revives the discredited "competitive injury" requirement. See supra notes 39-49 and

accompanying text. Cf. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3293 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (concluding that
Congress intended to provide a remedy only for "competitive injury, infiltration injury or other
economic injury resulting out of, but wholly distinct from, the predicate acts").
54. Some of these courts have characterized the racketeering enterprise injury as nebulous, unclear, and not adequately defined. See, e.g., Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 ("[t]here is no
room in the statutory language for an additional, amorphous 'racketeering injury' requirement"); In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1434-37 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Eisenberg v. Gagnon,
564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (unclear what this "something more" would be);
Ralston v. Capper, 569 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Mich.) (courts have provided no guidance
as to what constitutes such an injury). As one court pointed out, the impossibility of defining
the parameters is best illustrated by the fact that none of the courts imposing such a requirement found it to be met in the cases before them. Catanella,583 F. Supp. at 1437. Other
courts found the racketeering enterprise injury "analytically indistinguishable" from the discredited organized crime requirement. See Windsor Assocs. v. Greenfeld, 564 F. Supp. 273,
279 (D. Md. 1983). See also Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D.
Cal. 1983). Congressional imposition of such a requirement would not eliminate these
problems. See infra note 223.
55. Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 493 n.21 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
56. Flaherty, supra note 17.
57. The facts are taken from the Second Circuit opinions as reported.
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Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co. 8

The Sedima case involved a claim by Sedima, S.P.R.L., a Belgian exporter and importer, that it had been defrauded by Imrex,
with whom it had entered into a joint venture to provide electrical
parts to a NATO subcontractor. In its complaint, Sedima alleged
that Imrex and two of its officers knowingly prepared purchase orders, invoices, and credit memoranda which overstated charges and
costs Imrex had incurred on behalf of the joint venture. Based on
these fraudulent documents, Imrex allegedly received monies belonging to the joint venture. 59
The complaint contained three counts alleging civil RICO violations, as well as additional pendent state law claims. Two of the
RICO counts alleged that the fraudulent orders, invoices, and credit
memoranda constituted a pattern of racketeering activity; the predicate acts alleged were violations of the mail fraud"0 and wire fraud6 1
statutes. The third count alleged a RICO conspiracy. 2
The district court dismissed the RICO counts based on plaintiff's failure to allege a "RICO-type injury," which the court defined
as something more than injury from the predicate acts. a The Second
Circuit affirmed.64 The panel, Judge Oakes writing for the majority,
held that in order for a defendant to be held liable under section
1964(c), he must first have been criminally convicted of the underlying predicate acts.65 The panel further held that a plaintiff must also
show a "racketeering injury," which it characterized as an injury
"caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter," 66 and
which results, the court explained, when mobsters "cause systemic
harm to competition and the market, and thereby injure investors
67
and competitors.1
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
741 F.2d at 484.
Id. at 485. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
741 F.2d at 485. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982).
741 F.2d at 485.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
741 F.2d 482.

65. Id. at 496. Because the defendants had not been criminally convicted of the predicate acts, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. Ironically,
the individual defendants were subsequently indicted for grand larceny and falsifying business
records in connection with the same transactions at issue in the civil suit. Kessler, RICO Law's
Unexpected Results, Newsday, Jan. 7, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
66. 741 F.2d at 494.
67. Id. at 495-96.
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B. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades6 8
The Bankers Trust case involved an alleged scheme by officers
and shareholders of Braten Apparel Corporation (BAC) to eliminate, without payment, most of a $4,000,000 debt owed to Bankers
Trust. The scheme was allegedly based on BAC's concealment of its
holdings. BAC acquired all the stock of defendant Brookfield
Clothes, Inc. (Brookfield), an entity worth more than three million
dollars. Defendants Braten and Soifer, along with Feldesmen, an attorney for BAC, then agreed that although Soifer would be the
name owner of the stock, he would hold the stock in trust for BAC
while BAC was involved in bankruptcy proceedings.6 9
The day BAC transferred the stock to Soifer, it filed its petition
in bankruptcy. Not only did it fail to list the Brookfield stock as an
asset, but Braten, Rhoades, Soifer and Feldesmen all misrepresented
to Bankers Trust and the court that BAC had lost ownership of the
stock.70 Subsequently, Feldesmen and the individual defendants convinced BAC's creditors to approve a plan giving Bankers Trust only
1712% of its total claims, and relieving BAC of more than $4.3 million of its debts; had the Brookfield stock been included, BAC would
have been able to fully satisfy the Bankers Trust claims. 7 1 After the
bankruptcy court approved the plan, Soifer returned the Brookfield
stock to BAC. Upon learning that the true stock ownership had been
fraudulently concealed, Bankers Trust applied to revoke confirmation of the plan.7 2 Following a trial, the bankruptcy court revoked
the plan and ordered BAC to offer a realistic plan taking into account its ownership of the Brookfield stock. 3
The corporation then allegedly devised a new scheme to protect
its assets. It again transferred the Brookfield stock for little or no
consideration, purportedly to settle a civil action which arose out of
an unpaid loan, the proceeds of which had gone to several of the
Bankers Trust defendants. 4 The end result of the transfer was to
once again prevent Bankers Trust from receiving any benefit from
75
BAC's stock ownership.
68. 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
69. 741 F.2d at 513.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. In re Braten Apparel Corp., 21 B.R. 239 (Bank. S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 26 B.R.
1009 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
74. Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 514.

75. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1984

15

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 6

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:147

In addition to challenging the concealment of assets, Bankers
Trust also alleged that BAC and the individual defendants had instituted several frivolous lawsuits against it, the sole purpose of which
76
was to impede Bankers Trust in its attempt to collect BAC's debt.
Some of these allegations concerned two lawsuits commenced
against Bankers Trust in South Carolina, one filed by BAC, the
other by defendant Braten. According to the complaint, both Braten
and Rhoades bribed the judge who was presiding over these
actions. 7
The Bankers Trust complaint alleged that the defendants constituted a RICO "enterprise"; 78 that their actions7 9 constituted a
"pattern of racketeering activity"; 0 and that the defendants' formation and conduct of their enterprise through this pattern of activity
violated section 1962 of the RICO statute.81 Defendants moved for
judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the complaint failed to state
a claim under civil RICO. The district court agreed.82 The court,
noting that the statutory scheme provides a civil remedy for persons
injured "by reason of a violation of section 1962," construed that
phrase to require that a plaintiff allege a "distinct RICO injury as
opposed merely to a direct injury from the underlying predicate
acts."' 83 The court determined that Bankers Trust alleged an injury
resulting from the predicate acts and not a "distinct RICO" injury.
Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint.8 5
The Second Circuit affirmed. Judge Kearse, writing for the majority, held that a civil RICO complaint must allege a proprietary
injury caused by the defendant's "use of a pattern of racketeering
activity in connection with a RICO enterprise."" 6 The court concluded that Bankers Trust had alleged only injuries caused by the
predicate acts and not a separate injury caused by a violation of sec76. Id.
77. Id.

78. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
79. The complaint alleged that the defendant's activities constituted the criminal offenses of bankruptcy fraud, perjury, and bribery. 741 F.2d at 514.
80. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982); 18 U.S.C. 1961(5) (1982).
81. 741 F.2d at 514-15.
82. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
83. Id. at 1239-40.
84. Id. at 1242.
85. Id.
86. 741 F.2d at 516. The panel explained that it is the "confluence" of the pattern of
racketeering activity and "the use of that pattern to invest in, control or conduct a RICO
enterprise" that constitutes the "violation" and "must cause the proprietary injury." Id.
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tion 1962. It viewed the predicate acts alleged - i.e., the various
bankruptcy frauds and state law felonies87 - as isolated incidents
causing separate injuries, and not as part of a larger pattern of racketeering activity causing a "RICO" injury. Because the plaintiff's
injury would have been caused by the predicate acts, regardless of
any other racketeering activity the defendants may have engaged in,
the court reasoned, the complaint did not allege injury by reason of a
violation of section 1962 and was properly dismissed. 88
9
C. Furman v. Cirrito"

The Furman case arose out of the sale of the brokerage firm of
Bruns, Nordeman, Rea & Co. (Bruns) to Bache, Halsey, Stewart,
Shields, Inc. (Bache). Plaintiffs and defendants were general partners of Bruns. The defendants composed the partnership's executive
committee which essentially controlled the partnership's affairs, including the sale at issue; two of the defendants, Rea and Coleman,
were Bruns' managing directors.9 0
The civil RICO claim alleged that Bruns constituted an "enterprise" and that defendants conducted and participated in the enterprise's affairs, within the meaning of section 1962(c), by engaging in
a fraudulent scheme of misrepresentations and concealments during
the sale negotiations. This scheme, it was alleged, constituted a pattern of racketeering activity, in furtherance of which defendants
committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud.9 ' More specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants withheld material information during the sale negotiations; 92 misrepresented lucrative employ87. See supra note 79.
88. 741 F.2d at 516-18. Judge Cardamone dissented from the majority opinion, as he
did in Sedima. He argued that the various acts alleged, occurring over a nine-year period,
clearly constituted "a pattern of racketeering activity" within the meaning of § 1961(5), and,
further, that the individual defendants, by virtue of their control over the corporate entities
involved, performed these acts as part of conducting an "enterprise" within the meaning of §
1962. 741 F.2d at 523-24. Because each of these elements contributed to plaintiff's overall loss,
he argued, plaintiff had sufficiently alleged injury by reason of this violation. 741 F.2d at 523.
As Judge Cardamone stated at the outset of his opinion, "[i]f civil RICO does not provide a
remedy on the facts of this totally outrageous case, it never will." 741 F.2d at 518.
89. 741 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v. Cirrito, 105 S.
Ct. 355 (1985).
90. 741 F.2d at 526.

91.

Id.

92. Plaintiffs argued that defendants failed to reveal, until late in the negotiations, that
Bache would not complete the sale until each Bruns partner signed the purchase agreement.
Had they been aware of this requirement, plaintiffs argued, they would have been able to
bargain for and obtain certain payments. Id. at 525-26.
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ment arrangements they obtained for themselves; failed to consider
the merits of another offer to buy Bruns; and that defendants Rea

and Coleman made payments to the other defendants in93 order to
induce misrepresentations to plaintiffs regarding the sale.
Plaintiffs claimed business and property injury as a result of the
alleged misrepresentations and concealments. Had plaintiffs known
what defendants concealed from them, they claimed, they would
have been able to bargain for and obtain severance payments and
employment arrangements similar to those received by some of the
defendants. In addition, plaintiffs argued, the payments made by defendants caused the executive committee members who received
them to refrain from seeking alternative purchasers who may have
been willing to pay a higher price, and the consideration actually
paid by Bache was reduced because Bache absorbed the cost of
employment arrangements. 94

funding the defendants' "sweetheart"
In the district court, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim. The district court granted this motion on the
ground that plaintiffs failed
to allege "a separate, distinct racketeer95
ing enterprise injury."
The Second Circuit affirmed. Although the panel hearing the
case concluded that "neither the language of the statute nor its legis-

lative history imposes [a racketeering enterprise injury] requirement," it felt compelled to affirm based on the "controlling opinions"
of Sedima and Bankers Trust.96
93. Id.
94. Id. at 525-26.
95. Furman v. Cirrito, 578 F. Supp. 1535, 1541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). The defendants put
forth a number of additional arguments on support of their motion. They argued that Bruns
was not an enterprise, that the sale of Bruns did not constitute "affairs" of an enterprise, and
that there was no pattern of racketeering activity, all within the meaning of § 1962(c). Defendants further contended that plaintiffs were required to plead a tie to organized crime and they
failed to do so. The district court properly rejected these arguments. Id. at 1538-39.
96. 741 F.2d at 525. The panel (Judges Cardamone, Pratt, and Daniel M. Friedman of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) published its opinion solely to
express its sharp disagreement with the reasoning and conclusions of the majority opinions in
both Sedima and Bankers Trust insofar as they upheld the racketeering injury requirement.
Id. at 526. In an unusual move, the Furman panel also detailed the procedural history of the
three cases from the time of argument until the decisions were filed, including an agreement
among the members of the court that the opinions be filed in the order in which they were
completed (although Bankers Trust was argued before Sedima, Sedima was apparently "completed" first), and the denial of an internal request for en bane consideration of the three cases
before filing. See supra note 4.
Not only was the panel criticized for taking the position that it had to adhere to the
"controlling authority" in rendering its decision, the full court was criticized for failing to
consider these cases en bane. See Flaherty, supra note 17. Its failure to do so demonstrates
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V.

THE IMPACT OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT

As a result of these three decisions, civil RICO plaintiffs seeking to establish a claim under section 1964(c) in the Second Circuit
were required to show that: (1) the defendant was criminally convicted of the underlying predicate acts; and (2) the injured party
suffered a separate racketeering injury.
A.

Criminal Conviction Requirement

The most novel aspect of the Second Circuit decision in Sedima
was its holding that criminal conviction of the underlying predicate
acts is a condition precedent to maintaining a private civil action
under section 1964(c) .1 As Judge Oakes pointed out, no court prior
to the Second Circuit in Sedima had held that criminal convictions
are required before a civil RICO action could be maintained. a In
fact, prior case law is to the contrary. 9 The panel, however, based
rather graphically that the Second Circuit will rarely rehear cases en banc, relying instead on
the wisdom of the panel hearing the appeal. See Newman, En Bane Practice in the Second
Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50 BROOKLYN L. REv. 365, 382-84. See also Green v.
Santa Fe Indus. Inc., 533 F.2d 1309, 1310 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 429 U.S.
881 (1977); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1020 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The Second Circuit's extreme reluctance to
grant rehearings en banc, however significant the issues involved, is based in part on the notion
that important issues will catch the attention of the Supreme Court, and that the delay, costs,
and uncertainty that en bane consideration entails should be avoided when Supreme Court
review is inevitable. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d at 1310. This rationale for
denying en banc consideration is especially relevant where, as here, the case "will go to the
Supreme Court with full and thoughtful expositions of the opposing views of several members
of this Court." Id. Whatever the merits of this approach, it seems that the triumvirate of civil
RICO cases was particularly suited for en banc consideration. Unlike other important cases in
which the court denied rehearing en banc, the civil RICO cases had tremendous immediate
and widespread ramifications in the circuit, which, in the long run, may have unfairly
prejudiced litigants whose claims were dismissed on the basis of the Second Circuit's ruling in
Sedima.
97. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496.
98. Id. at 496-97.
99. See, e.g., Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 128687 (7th Cir. 1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir.
1982). United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925
(1975); Farmers Bank of Delaware v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp. 1278, 1280 (D. Del.
1978). Judge Oakes attributes this phenomenon primarily to what he characterizes as misplaced reliance on United States v. Cappetto. It is true that Cappetto involved the government's right to move for injunctive relief under § 1964(1), but Cappetto was merely the starting point for the courts that have considered the issue. The main thrust of their analysis has
not been based primarily on Capetto, but on the fact that if Congress had intended to limit
civil liability under § 1964(c) to those previously convicted, it would have done so by referring
to "convictions" in § 1964(c); Congress could have required either RICO convictions under §
1963 or convictions of the predicate acts described in § 1961(1). See USACO Coal Co. v.
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its holding on "statutory analysis," which it divided into the categories of "language" and "intent."
1. Language. - The panel majority in Sedima contended that
the differences in language between section 1964(c) and section 4 of
the Clayton Act, 100 and the presence of the words "indictable" and
"chargeable" in section 1961 (1), supported the criminal conviction
requirement.
Section 4 of the Clayton Act permits recovery for a business or
property injury "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws," 101 while the civil RICO statute speaks of a "violation" of section 1962. ''1 °2 Judge Oakes argued that Congress made this language change "with a specific intent in mind - to require that conviction at least of the predicate acts be had before a civil suit be
brought by a private person. ' 'los
The Sedima panel also concluded that the use of the words "indictable" and "chargeable" in section 1961(1) indicates that Congress did not intend to give civil courts the power to determine
whether an act is indictable or chargeable absent the return of an
indictment or information. 0

2. Intent. - The panel concluded that Congress intended that
only criminal conduct be punished, and that a civil RICO plaintiff
must meet the burden required to prove criminal conduct in a criminal case. 10 5 The majority went even further and concluded that criminal convictions are required because any lesser requirement, such as
mandating that a plaintiff satisfy a "reasonable doubt" standard,
would create problems regarding the proper burden of proof for each
Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d at 95 n.1 ("We find nothing in the plain language of RICO
to suggest that civil liability under § 1964(c) is limited only to those already convicted or
charged with criminal racketeering activity.").
100. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1982)).
101. Id.
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
103. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
104. Id. at 500. In setting forth this argument Judge Oakes opined that "being declared

a 'racketeer'

. .

. is being held to 'answer for' an 'infamous crime,'" and that a private plain-

tiff who brings a civil RICO action "becomes his own one-person grand jury, or in the case of
state felonies chargeable by information, his own prosecutor." Id. It seems that Judge Oakes
was saying not that the terms "indictable" and "chargeable" actually mean indictments must
be returned or informations filed before a civil plaintiff may bring suit, but that these terms

should be construed to mean as much simply because the stigma accompanying civil liability
under § 1964(c) is the equivalent of being charged with a criminal offense.
105. 741 F.2d at 501.
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element of the civil cause of action. 10 6 According to the court, failure
to include a criminal conviction requirement
would pervert the stat107
clause.
construction"
ute's "liberal
B.

Racketeering Injury

In addition to imposing the criminal conviction requirement,
both Sedima and Bankers Trust held that a plaintiff must allege and
prove a "racketeering injury" in order to maintain a civil RICO
claim.10
The Sedima majority, following the lead of the other courts that
have required some form of "racketeering injury,"'' 09 focused on the
"by reason of" language contained in section 1964(c) and concluded
that Congress intended to apply standing requirements "analogous"
to those found in the similarly worded Clayton Act." 0 The panel
then went further, defining what it meant by a "racketeering injury." It is in this proffered definition that the panel diverged from

other courts that have imposed such a requirement. Judge Oakes
wrote that
RICO was not enacted because criminals break laws, but because
mobsters, either through the infiltration of legitimate enterprises or
106.

Id. at 502. The panel concluded that it would be "extraordinarily difficult for juries

to understand the different burdens required for different elements of a civil case." Id. This

ignores the fact that juries are routinely confronted with different burdens of proof in civil
trials. In a federal securities fraud case, for example, a preponderance of the evidence standard
applies. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). Often a pendent state
law claim will require proof by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Van Alen v. Dominick
& Dominick, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 389, 402-03 (S.D.N.Y.), aff/d, 560 F.2d 347 (1976). There is
no reason to assume that it would be more difficult for a jury to comprehend two different
burdens of proof in a civil RICO case.
107. 741 F.2d at 502. The Sedima panel argued that liberal construction is only appropriate where criminal conduct has already been proved. The liberal construction clause is the
only one of its kind that applies to a federal criminal statute. See Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167, 184-90 (1980).
108. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96; Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516. Because the Sedima
and Bankers Trust panels took different approaches to this concept, the Second Circuit seemingly created two distinct and possibly conflicting requirements. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284
n.12. The Supreme Court distinguished the Second Circuit's decision in Sedima from Bankers
Trust, noting that
[T]he decision below does not appear identical to Bankers Trust. It established
a standing requirement, whereas Bankers Trust adopted a limitation on damages.
The one focused on the mobster element, the other took a more conceptual approach, distinguishing injury caused by the individual acts from injury caused by
their cumulative effect.
Id.
109. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
I10. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 495-96.
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through the activities of illegitimate enterprises, cause systemic
harm to competition and the market, and thereby injure investors
and competitors. . . .It is only when injury caused by this kind of
harm can be shown, therefore, that we believe that Congress intended that standing to sue civilly should be granted."' 1

This definition required a plaintiff to establish five separate elements to state a civil RICO claim. Under this reading of the statute,
a plaintiff would have to demonstrate that (1) mobsters, (2) as part
of an enterprise, (3) engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity (4)
through infiltration of a legitimate enterprise, or while conducting an
illegitimate one, and (5) which caused systemic harm to competition
and the market (6) thereby injuring investors and competitors.
This restrictive definition, combining the "organized crime connection" requirement with the "competitive injury" and "racketeering enterprise" injury requirements, would limit civil RICO claims
to very specific and limited circumstances - i.e., situations in which
a "mob" front organization
causes harm to the market through its
"racketeering activity. ' 112
C. Subsequent Decisions
Subsequent to the three Second Circuit decisions, at least two
other circuits handed down decisions discussing and interpreting the
holdings of Sedima, Bankers Trust, and Furman.
The Eighth Circuit, in Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 13s rejected the Second Circuit's holding in Sedima,
but nevertheless concluded that its own decision was consistent with
111. Id.
112. Cf. Bankers Trust v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d at 516. Judge Kearse, writing for the majority, explained that the "confluence" of the "pattern of racketeering activity" and "the use of
that pattern to invest in, control, or conduct, a RICO enterprise" must cause the proprietary
injury. Id.
Although rendered moot by the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, the Bankers Trust
standard is interesting because it is so similar to and perhaps the basis for Justice Marshall's
formulation of a "RICO injury" in his dissenting opinion in Sedima. Justice Marshall concluded that the "statute clearly contemplates recovery for injury resulting from the confluence
of events described in § 1962 and not merely from the commission of a predicate act." 105 S.
Ct. at 3297 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See Bankers Trust, 741 F.2d at 516.
Justice Marshall further determined that this "confluence" must cause some competitive,
infiltration or other economic injury. 105 S. Ct. at 3302 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). The Bankers Trust panel only required a "proprietary injury." 741 F.2d at 516. Moreover, under the
Bankers Trust standard, direct injuries would not be compensable. See id. By contrast, some
of the examples provided by Justice Marshall involve direct injuries that would be actionable
under certain circumstances. 105 S. Ct. at 3303 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
113. 742 F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985).
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Bankers Trust. The case involved a suit by Grant, a public accounting firm, alleging that it was the target of a pervasive scheme of

fraud designed to obtain its favorable audit of Tiffany Industries
(Tiffany). The scheme's purpose, Grant claimed, was to get credit on

better terms, and enable Tiffany to mislead its stockholders, the public, and the Securities and Exchange Commission into believing that
11 4
the company was financially sound.
Although the court reiterated its earlier holding in Bennett v.
Berg" 5 rejecting a racketeering enterprise injury qua competitive or

commercial injury,"16 it went on to explain that in Alexander Grant
it did not have to "consider the nature of a racketeering enterprise
injury . . . for it is clear that Grant's complaint does not simply

allege injury from the underlying predicate acts."' 1 The court based
this conclusion on the fact that Grant alleged that Tiffany had con-

ducted a pattern of fraud "that enabled it to remain in business,"
and that Grant "continued to provide its accounting services to Tif-

fany for a time greater than it would have had the fraud not occurred.""" In effect, the prolonged life given to Tiffany as an "enterprise" enhanced the injury caused to Grant, and Grant therefore was
injured "by reason of a RICO violation" rather than simply by the
predicate acts." x9
114. Id. 409-10. The alleged fraud included a number of material misrepresentations,
and forgery of important documents by Tiffany officials during the course of the audit. Grant
claimed that as a result it suffered theft of services because it had to spend increased time on
the audit, causing an increase in fees that was never paid; it incurred large expenses as a result
of the SEC investigation; and it suffered damages to its business reputation. Id. at 411.
115. 685 F.2d 1053 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd on rehearing,710 F.2d 1361 (en banc), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983).
116. Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413.
117. Id. Defendants also argued that Grant suffered only an indirect injury insufficient
to provide standing under § 1964(c), relying on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Cenco, Inc. v.
Siedman & Siedman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). In Cenco,
the Seventh Circuit held that an accounting firm which sought indemnification on a crossclaim against its codefendants did not have standing to sue under § 1964(c) because it suffered
only an "indirect" injury. The Eighth Circuit quite properly distinguished Cenco from the case
before it on the basis that Grant did not seek indemnification, but instead sought damages for
the amount of its lost fees, caused directly by defendant's fraud. The court also correctly rejected the Seventh Circuit's holding in Cenco, noting that the direct-indirect dichotomy proffered in Cenco was inconsistent with the intent of Congress. 742 F.2d at 411-12. In any event,
Cenco's continued validity as precedent is dubious in light of the Seventh Circuit's subsequent
decisions in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985) and Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S.Ct. 508 (1983).
118. 742 F.2d at 413.
119. The facts of this case provide a good example of how an "enterprise," as opposed to
an individual or individuals, enhances the injury suffered by a defrauded party, thus warrant-
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The Alexander Grant court explained that Sedima held that
section 1964(c) "requires that the injury result from mobster activity
or the efforts of organized crime"; 120 the Alexander Grant court rejected that view but saw its decision as consistent with Bankers
Trust. Unfortunately, it did not explain why. Presumably the court
viewed Grant's proprietary injuries as resulting from the "confluence" of the pattern of Tiffany's fraudulent activities and the use of
that pattern to conduct Tiffany's business for an extended period of
time, rather than merely from the predicate acts themselves.
Next, the Seventh Circuit decided Haroco v. American National Bank & Trust Co.121 The Haroco case involved a claim by
borrowers of the American National Bank and Trust Company
against the bank, one of its officers, and an officer of its parent company. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had defrauded them by
overstating the prime rate which determined the plaintiffs' variable
interest payments to the bank. 122 Plaintiffs asserted two civil RICO
counts as well as various pendent state law claims. 2 3 The district
court dismissed the complaint based on its conclusion that plaintiffs
did not suffer any injury by reason of a RICO violation in addition
to any injuries caused by the predicate acts of fraud. 24 The Seventh
Circuit reversed. 25 After reviewing the three decisions which had
just been issued by the Second Circuit, the court rejected the Second
Circuit's conclusion in both Sedima and Bankers Trust that a plaintiff must plead and prove an injury above and beyond that caused by
the predicate acts of racketeering. 26 The Seventh Circuit refused to
accept the Second Circuit's definition of the racketeering injury requirement, finding such an attempt to limit the scope of RICO "coning relief under § 1964(c) regardless of whether the ultimate injury emanates from the predi-

cate acts. For instance, the fact that Tiffany was able to prolong its life as an enterprise
through its fraud increased the injury inflicted on Grant, even though the injury actually resulted from the fradulent acts themselves.
120. Alexander Grant, 742 F.2d at 413.
121. 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), af'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).

122. Id. at 385.
123. Id.

124. Id. at 386.
125. Id at 384.
126. Id. at 399. The court noted that

[i]
f the safety or stability of the Republic demanded, we might be justified in pursuing such an aggressive jurisprudence. But, particularly at the pleading stage, we
seem to be dealing with much smaller stakes - legal fees and the sensibilities of
prominent defendants alleged to be "racketeers." Those stakes do not appear high

enough to justify our rejecting Congress's choice of a statute that sweeps broadly.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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trary to the language and purpose of [the statute]. '' 127
VI.

THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW

As a result of the conflict within the Second Circuit and among
the various courts that considered the issue, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in both Sedima and Haroco.128 Prior to Sedima,
the Court had decided only two RICO cases, both occurring in the
criminal context. In both cases, the Court opted for a broad reading
of the statute's provisions.
In United States v. Turkette, 2 9 the Court broadly construed the
term "enterprise" as used in the statute, holding that it encompasses
both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 13 0 Noting the broad purposes and goals of the RICO statute, the Court determined that
Congress did not intend to limit the statute to the infiltration of legitimate businesses, a narrower aspect of organized criminal activity. 3 1 In response to the argument that such an interpretation would
alter the balance between federal and state law enforcement, the
Court explained that this was precisely the intent of Congress when
it enacted RICO; Congress meant to "alter somewhat the role of the
Federal Government in the war against organized crime" because
existing law was not capable of dealing with the problem. 3 2 Since
there was "no argument that Congress acted beyond its power"
127. Id. at 389. Essentially, the court viewed its decision in Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d
1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983) as controlling. Although the criminal
conviction requirement was not presented to the court, it noted that the Second Circuit's holding in Sedima conflicted with its decision in Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms,
Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1983).
128. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
3275 (1985); Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 105 S. Ct. 3291 (1985).
129. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
130. Id. Defendant was indicted for "conspiracy to conduct and participate in the affairs
of an enterprise . . . through a pattern of racketeering." The enterprise was formed for the
illegal purposes of drug trafficking, arson, insurance fraud, bribery, and influencing state court
proceedings. The defendant argued that RICO was intended to protect legitimate enterprises
and did "not make it criminal to participate in an association which performs only illegal acts
and has not infiltrated. . . a legitimate enterprise." The defendant's argument did not prevail.
Id. at 584.
131. Id. at 590. In rejecting the idea that the civil remedies "would have utility only
with respect to legitimate enterprise," the Court pointed out that the aim of the civil remedies
"is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains." Id. at 585. This observation
would seem to militate in favor of a broad reading of § 1964(c).
132. Id. at 587. This explanation also seems to rebut the argument that allowing civil
RICO claims to proceed where the only injury is caused by the predicate acts of common law
fraud results in federal garden variety or state law fraud claims.
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when it enacted RICO, the Court ruled, "the courts are without authority to restrict the application of the statute."' 33
More recently, in Russello v. United States,3 4 the Court construed the term "interest" in section 1963(a)(1) to include insurance
proceeds or profits received as a result of arson activities. 135 Although the term was not specifically defined in the statute, the Court
looked to the plain meaning and determined "that the term 'interest'
comprehends all forms of real and personal property, including profits and proceeds."' 36 The Court further concluded that RICO's legislative history did not reveal "a limited Congressional intent" with
regard to this provision, in light of the fact that RICO "was intended to provide new weapons of unprecedented3 7scope for an assault
upon organized crime and its economic roots.'
While these two cases involved "criminal" aspects of RICO,
they nevertheless demonstrated the Court's intention to take a broad
view of RICO's scope in order to fully effectuate its remedial purposes. 38 The Court's decision in Sedima is consistent with this intention. In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,13 9 the Court rejected both
the underlying criminal conviction and racketeering injury requirements that had been imposed by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on plaintiffs seeking to maintain a private action under section
133. Id. This admonition is equally cogent in the civil RICO context.
134. 104 S. Ct. 296 (1983).
135. Id. at 298. Defendant was part of a group of individuals associated for the purpose
of committing arson with the intent to defraud insurance companies. The arsonists would burn
buildings owned by individuals associated with the ring. The owner would then file "an inflated
proof of loss statement," collect the proceeds, and pay the co-conspirators. The association
later bought buildings, secured excess insurance on them, and then had the buildings burned in
order to collect the proceeds. Id.
136. Id. at 299.
137. Id. at 302.
138. Cf. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 493-94. The Sedima court reasoned that since the Court
in Turkette was not specifically dealing with the intended scope of the civil remedy, its discussion of the criminal enforcement provisions "provides little or no guidance" as to how "the
complex statutory scheme providing for the private civil remedy" should be handled. Id.
In Turkette, the Court concluded that it is "untenable" that the existence of the civil
remedies "limits the scope of ihis criminal provision." 452 U.S. at 585. It is equally untenable
to argue, as the Sedima majority implicitly did, that the existence of criminal remedies limits
the scope of the civil provisions.
139. 105 S.Ct. 3275 (1985). In a per curiam opinion, the Court also affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision in Haroco, viewing it "as consistent with" the Court's opinion in
Sedima. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105 S.Ct. 3291 (1985). Interestingly enough, the Court declined to address petitioners' "late-blooming argument that the
complaint failed to allege a violation of § 1962(c)." Petitioners claimed that the complaint
failed to show that the enterprise was "conducted" through a pattern of racketeering activity.
105 S.Ct. at 3292.
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1964(c).
A.

The Criminal Conviction Requirement

After briefly reviewing RICO's legislative history, the Court analyzed the criminal conviction requirement imposed by the Second
Circuit panel in Sedima. Initially, the Court concluded that "[t]he
language of RICO gives no obvious indication that a civil action can
proceed only after a criminal conviction."14 The Court went on to
reject the Second Circuit's interpretation of section 1964(c) equating
the use of the word "violation" with "criminal conviction," finding
instead that the word "violation" only requires a "failure to adhere
to legal requirements. ' 141 Convinced that the Second Circuit's interpretation was supported by neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history, the Court reasoned that if "Congress intended to
impose this novel requirement, there would have been at least some
' 42
mention of it in the legislative history, even if not in the statute."
The Court's analysis is sound. In fact, the term "violation" is
commonly used in statutes that define the scope of civil remedies
permitted for violations of a statute.14 3 For example, the word "violation" appears in sections of the antitrust laws defining prohibited activity as well as in sections providing sanctions for violations of those
laws. 4 Yet, a criminal conviction is not a prerequisite to obtaining
civil remedies under these statutes.
The Second Circuit based its conclusion that violation must
mean criminal conviction in part on the fact that section 4 of the
Clayton Act provides a remedy for "anything forbidden" in the antitrust laws,1 45 while civil RICO provides a remedy for a "violation"
140. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3281.
141. Id. The Court also concluded that even if "violation" meant "conviction," it would
mean a conviction under RICO, not of the predicate offenses. Id. This is probably true, since §

1964(c) creates a remedy for a "violation" of § 1962, not of § 1961(l).
142.

Id. at 3282.

143.

Sedima, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117

(1982). Section 1117 is part of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1127, and provides:

When a violation of any right of the registrant . . . shall have been established in
any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled ...to
recover (1)defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3)
the costs of the action.
Id. The Supreme Court concluded that, "[w]hen Congress intended that the defendant have

been previously convicted, it said so." Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3281 n.7.
144.

E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25, 26 (1982). The Second Circuit acknowledged this point,

but distinguished these provisions from the civil RICO language at issue. See Sedima, 741
F.2d at 499 n.47.
145. Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
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of section 1962.146 The Court surmised that this difference in wording means that Congress intended civil RICO to reach only conduct
already proven criminal. 47
The difference between the language in the antitrust laws and
RICO is probably best explained by the fact that civil RICO permits
recovery for a "violation" of a specific statutory provision, section
1962, while the reach of the Clayton Act's section 4 is broader, applying to many different provisions of the wide-ranging antitrust
laws. Section 4, in other words, applies not to violation of a single
statutory provision, but to "anything forbidden" in any of the antitrust provisions. Indeed, it is also possible to argue, as the Second
Circuit admitted, that "'violation' is simply a shorthand way of saying 'by reason of anything forbidden,'" and that the change was
made "in a desire merely to eschew surplusage. 1 4 Whatever the
explanation for the variation in language between the two provisions,
it seems clear that the use of the word "violation" in civil RICO no
more means a criminal violation than it does when used in the Lanham Act, 14 or the antitrust laws.
The Second Circuit expressed concern that lack of a prior conviction would result in practical problems because it would require
juries to apply different standards of proof to different parts of a
case.1 50 The court assumed that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would be required of the predicate acts, while the preponderance of
the evidence standard would apply to other elements of a RICO
claim. 151 According to the court, this would result in jury confusion.
The Supreme Court dismissed this concern by noting that it is unclear whether the predicate acts must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.152 Furthermore, the Court concluded that even if the
reasonable doubt standard were to be applied, the "resulting logistical difficulties . . . would not be so great" as to justify the imposi-

tion of a criminal conviction requirement "that cannot be found in
15(a) (1982)).
146. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
147. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 498-99.
148. Id. at 498. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282 n.8 ("It seems more likely that the

language was chosen because it is more succinct than that in the Clayton Act, and is consistent
with neighboring provisions.")
149. Trademark (Lanham) Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117. See supra note 143.
150. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501-02.
151. Id.
152. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282. Although the Court's opinion could be read as approving the use of a preponderance standard of proof in civil RICO cases, it explicitly left the

question open. Id. See infra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
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'
the statute and that Congress . . .did not envision."153
Again, this analysis is correct. The burden of proof question, as

the Supreme Court pointed out, remains unsettled.154 Logistical difficulties that would result from multiple standards of proof in the
same trial are relatively minor and certainly do not justify such an
extreme solution as requiring criminal convictions.1 55 Moreover, in
holding that RICO calls for only criminal conduct to be punished,
the Second Circuit misconstrued RICO. The RICO statute is not
exclusively a criminal statute, but a remedial one, which provides

civil remedies and criminal penalties for violations of its substantive
provisions.' 56 Section 1964(c) provides civil remedies for civil violations of RICO's substantive provisions, and not merely remedies for
conduct already proven criminal.
The Second Circuit also feared that "constitutional questions"
would arise if the statute were given a broader construction. The
Supreme Court summarily rejected any notion that a "constitutional
crisis" would arise in the absence of a criminal conviction requirement.15 7 While the Second Circuit based its constitutional argument

on the fact that civil liability "for offenses criminal in nature" would
stigmatize a defendant "with the appellation 'racketeer,' ,158,the Supreme Court dismissed the idea of stigmatization arising from civil
RICO liability. Any stigmatization resulting from RICO liability,
the Court concluded, is not "reduced by making certain that the de153. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3282. The Supreme Court also pointed out that the Second
Circuit's holding "is not without problematic consequences of its own." Id. at 5037 n.9. The
examples provided by the Court militate against the imposition of a criminal conviction requirement by Congress at a later date.
154. See supra note 152.
155. See supra note 106.
156. Ironically, by requiring the defendant's prior conviction of the predicate acts, the
Second Circuit would have placed a heavier burden on a civil RICO plaintiff than the government bears in a criminal RICO case. In a criminal case, the government need only prove the
commission of the predicate acts as elements of the overall RICO offense; it need not obtain
separate convictions of each predicate act. 18 U. S. C. § 1962. As Judge Oakes acknowledged
below "in a criminal RICO case, the proof of the predicate act convictions may be made under
the same indictment, in the same trial and coordinately with the proof of the RICO offense(s)." Sedima, 741 F.2d at 501. Under the Second Circuit's rationale it would have been
easier in some cases to establish a criminal RICO violation rather than a § 1964(c) claim,
because in a criminal RICO case, proof of the "enterprise" element and the "pattern of racketeering activity" need not be "distinct and independent, as long as the proof offered is sufficient to satisfy both elements." United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983). See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
157. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283. The Court did not "view the statute as being so close
to the constitutional edge." Id.
158. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49; Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283.
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fendant is guilty of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt."1 ' Instead of
insuring that the protections of a criminal proceeding "were previously afforded by requiring prior convictions," the Court, as did
Judge Cardamone in dissent below, posited that the proper solution
"is to provide those protections in the context of a civil
proceeding." 1 60
Finally, the Court pointed out that the "prior conviction requirement would be inconsistent with" Congressional policy.16 1 Indeed, the "private attorney general" theory of civil RICO and statutes like it is based on the notion that these statutes are needed to fill
in the gaps left by the government's failure to prosecute in certain
situations. Imposing a criminal conviction requirement would, as the
Court pointed out, largely defeat this purpose because suits could be
16 2
brought "only against those already brought to justice.1
B.

Racketeering Injury

Like most courts that have considered it, the Supreme Court
was "somewhat hampered by the vagueness" of the concept of racketeering injury.16 3 Nevertheless, after considering the Second Circuit's
characterization of a racketeering injury, the Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's holding that a plaintiff seeking to establish a civil RICO claim must show "injury. . .caused by an activity
159. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3283. (emphasis in original). Although the Second Circuit in
Sedima makes much of the stigma accompanying a civil RICO suit, statutes should not be
restricted based on any perceived stigmatizing effect they may have on a defendant's reputation. See Sedlma, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). In any event, the stigmatizing
effect of civil RICO liability is more imagined than real or, as Judge Cardamone observed, "a
bit overstated." Id.
160. Sedlma, 105 S. Ct. at 3284; Sedima, 741 F.2d at 506 (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
Such "protection" might include an enhanced burden of proof. See infra notes 208-20 and
accompanying text. Another protection might be to require that a plaintiff plead the predicate
acts of racketeering "with enough specificity to show there is probable cause" that the acts
were committed. Bache, Halsey, Stuart & Shields, Inc. v. Tracy Collins Bank, 558 F. Supp.
1042 (D. Utah 1983). See Carbone, Inc. v. Proctor Ellison Co., 102 F.R.D. 951, 953 (D.
Mass. 1984). At the very least, the requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) that fraud be pleaded
"with particularity" should be strictly enforced in civil RICO actions alleging predicate acts of
fraud. See Carbone, 102 F.R.D. at 953; Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., 597 F. Supp. 1547, 1560
(N.D. Ohio 1984).
161. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284. See also Alcorn County v. U.S. Interstate Supplies,
Inc., 731 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1984) ("provision for attorney's fees in section 1964(c)
was intended by Congress, like the provision for treble damages, to encourage private enforcement of the laws on which RICO is predicated."); Blakey, The Act is Neither Anti-Business
Nor Pro-Business, It's Pro-Victim, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 26, 1985, at 25.
162. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
163. Id.
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which RICO was designed to deter. 164 The Court found this definition of racketeering injury "unhelpfully tautological.' 6 5 In the process, the Supreme Court unequivocally rejected any attempt to limit
RICO based on the concept of a distinct "racketeering injury."' 66 It
reasoned that such a requirement is unnecessary, simply because any
compensable injury consists of "harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern."'6 Thus, a plaintiff need not
show a racketeering injury separate and apart from injury resulting
from the predicate acts because any damages by reason of a section

1962(c) violation "will flow [directly] from the commission of the
predicate acts.""6 8
As the Supreme Court pointed out, underlying the Second Circuit's holding in Sedima was its concern about the extraordinary
uses to which the statute has been put and its fear that an inexorable

expansion of the civil RICO phenomenon could prove disastrous for
both the federal court system and for potential civil RICO defendants.1 6 9 The Supreme Court shared these concerns and recognized
164. Id. (quoting Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496).
165. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3284.
166. Id. The Court explained that it "need not pinpoint the Second Circuit's precise
holding, for we perceive no distinct 'racketeering injury' requirement." Id. at 3285.
167. Id.
168. Id. The Court intimated that one way to limit the statute's reach would be to formulate a narrow definition of what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity" under §
1961(5). See id. at 3285 n.14, 3287 (noting that the issue of whether the predicate acts alleged
in Sedima constituted a pattern was not before it). In other words, while a pattern consists of
at least two acts of racketeering activity, it also consists of something more. Although the
Court did not specify what that something more should be, it did provide a few suggestions
culled from RICO's legislative history. Id. at 3285 n.14.
169. Prominent in Judge Oakes' opinion is both the notion that a broad reading of §
1964(c) would be disastrous because it would open the federal court floodgates to frivolous
claims, and the related idea that most civil RICO suits are just not RICO material because
the defendants are "legitimate" businesspeople, not mobsters. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 48589. Both assumptions are erroneous.
It is not true that the increase in civil RICO litigation has overloaded the federal courts.
It has been estimated that pending RICO cases are numbered "in the hundreds" - only a
small fraction of the total civil cases pending in federal courts throughout the country. See
Flaherty, supra note 17, at 30. There is also no indication that the in terrorem settlement
value of these treble damage claims increased with the "explosion" of civil RICO litigation.
Indeed, any increase in settlement value may serve to promote fair and expeditious settlements
of valid claims, without leading to undeserved windfalls, because of the delay, expense, and
uncertainty surrounding civil RICO litigation. See Haroco, 747 F.2d at 399 n.16. In any
event, these considerations involve policy choices better left tO Congress.
In addition, Congress specifically included "fraud" as a species of racketeering activity
under § 1961(1). Therefore, the kind of conduct involved in Sedima and similar "white-collar
fraud" cases was precisely what Congress sought to reach when it enacted RICO. See Furman
v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 528-29 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated and remanded sub nom. Joel v.
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as well that civil RICO might have evolved into something that was
different from what its enactors had envisioned. 170 Yet the Court
correctly concluded the statute's "breadth" was not a sufficiently
compelling reason for the courts to rewrite its provisions by imposing
"amorphous" standing requirements.171
In sum, the Supreme Court in Sedima reaffirmed the general
principle that statutory correction or revision is best left to Congress.
More specifically, the Court definitively determined that, as far as
section 1964(c) is concerned, lower courts should eschew artificial
restrictions on the statute's scope, and instead concentrate on providing increased procedural protections to civil RICO defendants.17 2
C. The Dissent
In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Powell, contended that the language and legislative history
of section 1964(c) "disclose a narrower interpretation of the statute
that fully effectuates Congress' purposes, and that does not make
compensable

. . .

a host of claims that Congress never intended to

bring within RICO's purview."173 Essentially, the dissent reiterated
the Second Circuit's conclusion that since Congress did not explicitly
consider or approve the broad use of civil RICO, it must not have
intended such a result.
The dissent pointed to the presence of mail and wire fraud predicate offenses as the most "significant reason" for the expansive use
of civil RICO.' 7" This may well be true. 75 Yet the dissent went on
to compare the restraining influence of prosecutorial discretion in
pursuing criminal RICO actions based on mail and wire fraud predicate offenses, with the absence of such restraint on the part of priCirrito, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985). As Professor Blakey explains in his well-documented article,

white collar fraud is a billion dollar business that law enforcement, with its limited resources
and capabilities, cannot possibly hope to eliminate. Blakey, supra note 9, at 341-49. By providing for a private right of action which carries a threat of severe economic sanction - i.e.,
treble damages and attorney's fees - Congress added a powerful weapon to the depleted
arsenal used to fight corporate and other white-collar fraud. See id.

170. Sedirna, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
171. Id. See supra note 29.
172. Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3283, 3287.
173. Id. at 5040 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Since the dissent concluded that the civil
RICO claims at issue should be dismissed for failure to allege a "RICO injury," it did not
reach the question of whether a civil RICO action can proceed only after a criminal conviction
is obtained. Id. at 3304 n.2.
174. Id. at 3293-96 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
175. See supra note 31.
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vate civil litigants who bring civil RICO claims. 176 The absence of
such a restraining influence, the dissent contended, necessitates a
narrow interpretation of the scope of the private civil remedy under
RICO.1 7 There are two problems with this reasoning.
First, by comparing the exercise of prosecutorial discretion with
the absence of such discretion on the part of private litigants, the
dissent incorrectly equates a criminal prosecution with a civil damage suit. Furthermore, the fact that the federal courts have interpreted the mail and wire fraud statutes broadly is not relevant to a
determination of what the language of section 1964(c) requires. It is
indisputable that the mail and wire fraud statutes are broadly written. Arguments in support of limitations on these statutes or on civil
RICO, however, should be made to Congress and not the courts.
It is clear that civil RICO has, in the words of Justice Marshall,
"brought profound changes to our legal landscape."' 7 8 Justice Marshall is concerned that the broad reading given civil RICO by the
majority "virtually eliminates decades of legislative and judicial development of private civil remedies under the federal securities
laws" 17 9 because it allows plaintiffs to avoid the limitations of the
securities laws "merely by alleging violations of other predicate
acts."'' 80 In support of this position, Justice Marshall notes that
courts "have paid close attention to matters such as standing, culpability, causation, reliance and materiality, as well as the definitions
of 'securities' and 'fraud'" under the securities laws.',' While they
may have paid "close attention" to these matters, courts have
176. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3294-96 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
177. Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice Marshall seemed to dismiss the possibility
that utilizing a narrow definition of the pattern requirement might be an appropriate way to

limit RICO. Indeed, he opined that under the majority opinion "two fraudulent mailings or
uses of the wires occurring within ten years of each other might constitute a 'pattern of racke-

teering activity'." Id. at 3293. This ignores the implied, if not express, admonition of the majority that a pattern requires more than merely two acts of racketeering within ten years. Id.

at 3285 n.14.
178. Id. at 3296 (Marshall, J.,dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that the "broad"
view of civil RICO has effectively federalized state common law, bringing about "dramatic

changes in the nature of commercial litigation." Id. These changes are more illusory than real.
Most state law fraud claims arising out of complex commercial transactions are brought in

federal court, either on grounds of diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1982), or as pendent claims to a federal cause of action. See Flaherty, supra note 17, at col.

3. See UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
179.
180.
181.

Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3295 (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
Id. (Marshall, J.,dissenting).
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broadly interpreted provisions dealing with these issues."8 2
Significantly, Justice Marshall overlooks the fact that neither
mail and wire fraud nor fraud in the sale of securities is per se actionable under RICO. These offenses only become actionable when
they are part of a pattern of racketeering activity conducted by an
enterprise. In addition, it seems logical that as the case law under
RICO develops further, courts will look for guidance to legislative
and judicial restrictions on claims of fraud brought under the securities laws in determining whether predicate acts have been adequately
pleaded and proved.
The dissent also pointed out that since the statute excludes recovery for personal injuries, Congress must not have intended victims to recover for injuries resulting directly from the predicate
acts.18 3 The RICO statute, however, was enacted to deal with economic, rather than personal, injury. In this regard, Congress did not
limit recovery to those incurring only indirect economic injury, it
merely limited recovery to "anyone" incurring a business or property
injury.18 4 Indeed, if Congress intended to limit recovery to those incurring only indirect injury, it would have limited recovery to "business injury," as opposed to "business or property" injury, suffered by
a limited class of persons, rather than by "any person," as the statute now reads.
Furthermore, by arguing that the statute "contemplates recovery for injury resulting from the confluence of events described in
section 1962 and not merely from the commission of a predicate
act,"' 185 the dissent misconstrued the statute's language. As the majority explained, liability results from the section 1962 violation, but
182. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6
(1971) (plaintiffs can maintain securities actions for fraud "touching" the sale of securities);
United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (reporter criminally liable under

§ 10(b) for misappropriating information by disclosing the content and timing of market sensitive stories, where reporter was aware that his employer, the Wall Street Journal, had a policy
against such disclosure); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.), affd after
remand, 772 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 199 (1983) (outsider who

breaches his fiduciary duty by misappropriating confidential market information entrusted to
his employer and who trades on the basis of that information may be criminally liable under §
10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5). Cf. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2112 (1985) (misappropriation theory of liability applicable in SEC injunctive and disgorgement proceedings). But see Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983),

cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 1280 (1984) (misappropriation theory of liability not applicable in
private actions under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
183. Sedima, 105 S.Ct. at 3302. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
185.

Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3297. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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harm results from the predicate acts which, of course, must be sufficiently related to constitute a pattern and have been committed in
connection with the conduct of an enterprise.18 6
The dissent relied on legislative history to support its formulation of an economic injury requirement, concluding that Congress
intended to provide a means for businessmen "to recover damages
for competitive injury, infiltration injury, or other economic injury
1
resulting out of, but wholly distinct from, the predicate acts."'
While the sponsors of RICO were greatly concerned with economic
losses suffered by competitors of businesses infiltrated by racketeers
,and such losses are compensable under the statute, Congress did not
define compensable injury under RICO as narrowly as the dissent
suggested.18 8 In supporting its conclusions by "[p]utting together"
,various segments of legislative history, 89 the dissent unfortunately
overlooked the fact "Congress' self-consciously expansive language"19 10 speaks for itself. The Court should, therefore, not infer
any limitations on the statute based on a piecemeal analysis of legislative history.
186. Id. at 3285 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 3302 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The economic injury requirement seems to
be an amalgamation of the "commercial" and "competitive" injury requirements discussed
previously in this Article. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. While Justice Marshall seemed to look to antitrust law in part for guidance in formulating his proposed limitation, he did not suggest directly imposing restrictive antitrust standing requirements on civil
RICO plaintiffs. Instead, he synthesized the antitrust competitive injury requirement with a
concept he called "infiltration" or "business" injury. Id. at 3296-3303. Ironically, although the
dissent emphasized that Congress did not intend to provide a remedy under RICO for direct
victims of racketeering activity, ostensibly because such persons have other "adequate" remedies at law, many of the examples of "RICO injuries" cited by the dissent involve recovery for
direct injuries. See id. at 3302.
188. It may be true, as Justice Marshall claimed, that the "principal target" of the
RICO statute "was the economic power of racketeers and its toll on legitimate businessman."
Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3299 (Marshall, J., dissenting). There is, however, no indication that
Congress intended to deny recovery to others who satisfied the literal requirements of the statute. Id. at 5039 n.15.
189. Id. at 3296-3303 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 3286. Even though Justice Powell admitted that both United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981) and Russello v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 296 (1984), stand for
the proposition that the statute must be read broadly and contrued liberally to effectuate its
remedial purposes, he distinguished both of these cases from Sedima because they involved
RICO's criminal provisions whereas this case involved a civil claim. 105 S. Ct. 3288-91 (Powell, J., dissenting). Yet, it is incongruous to argue that although a statute's criminal provisions
should be liberally construed, its civil provisions should be narrowly construed. To the contrary, the fact that a statute's criminal provisions must be liberally construed militates strongly
in favor of liberally construing the corresponding civil provisions. See id. at 3283 n.10 ("Indeed, if Congress' liberal construction mandate is to be applied anywhere, it is in § 1964,
where RICO's remedial purposes are most evident.").
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Justice Powell wrote a separate dissent. He also advocated a
narrow reading of the statute's provisions, 191 but, more importantly,
he focused on the "pattern" requirement of section 1961(5) in proposing possible ways to limit the scope of civil RICO. 9 ' Justice Powell concluded that "[b]y construing 'pattern' to focus on the manner
in which the crime was perpetrated, courts could go a long way toward limiting the reach of the statute to its intended target - organized crime."' 3 Furthermore, Justice Powell noted that the majority conceded that "pattern" could be narrowly construed, but
expressed concern that the Court had read the statute so broadly
that it may be impossible for courts to construe the "pattern" requirement in a manner consistent with Congressional intent.9 This
fear appears unwarranted. Under section 1961(5), a pattern consists
of "at least" two acts of racketeering within ten years. What may be
required in addition to these two acts has not been conclusively established. 9 5 The language of this particular provision gives sufficient
leeway for the courts to develop a restrictive view of what a "pattern" is, notwithstanding the "broad" reading given to the language
of section 1964(c) in this case. 9 6 At this point, the issue of what
constitutes a "pattern" is open for resolution.
VII.

LIMITING CIVIL

RICO AFTER Sedima

While the Supreme Court rejected the approaches taken by the
Second Circuit in attempting to limit the scope of civil RICO, it did
not rule out the possibility that there may be ways to restrict RICO
without violating either the statutory language or congressional intent. It invited lower courts to focus on the "pattern" requirement of
section 1961(5) as a means of limiting civil RICO claims. The Court
also left open the question of what burden of proof is applicable in
civil RICO actions.
A.

The Pattern of Racketeering Activity

The Court intimated that it was possible to devise a restrictive
definition of what constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity"
which could effectively limit the types of claims that can be brought
191.
192.

Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3288-91 (Powell, J.,dissenting).
Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).

193.

Id. at 5047. (Powell, J., dissenting).

194.
195.
196.

Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
See supra note 28.
See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286-87.
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under the statute. 197 For example, section 1961(5) states that a pattern of racketeering requires "at least two acts of racketeering activity."19 The statute does not explicitly describe what else, if anything, is required. The legislative history of RICO indicates that two
isolated acts of racketeering activity do not per se constitute a pattern. Some combination of "continuity plus relationship" between
the acts of racketeering activity must also be shown.199 The courts
have yet to determine conclusively what combination of activities
will satisfy this somewhat amorphous standard. 200
A recent ABA report on civil RICO supports the view that the
pattern requirement should be interpreted narrowly. 20 1 The report,
cited by both the majority and by Justice Powell in dissent, 202 points
out that the "pattern" element was intended by Congress to be a
limiting concept, designed to restrict RICO to "planned, ongoing,
continuing (activity) as opposed to sporadic, unrelated, isolated
criminal episodes. ' 208 In order to effectuate this intent, Justice Powell argued that a plaintiff must plead and prove that (1) the racketeering acts are somehow related, (2) they are part of a common
scheme, and (3) there is either some sort of continuity between the
204
acts or a threat of continuing illegal activity.
The argument in favor of a narrow view of the pattern require197.

See id. at 3287 ("[tjhe 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO has been put ap-

pear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses.

. .

and the failure of

Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' ") See also id. at 3285

n.14 (discussing the legislative history of the pattern requirement).
198.

18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).

199. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
200. Some courts have limited RICO, both in the criminal and civil context, by requiring a series of ongoing acts which are part of a common scheme. See, e.g., Teleprompter of
Erie, Inc. v. City of Erie, 537 F. Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Stofsky,
409 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Most courts, however, have simply assumed that two acts

committed within ten years constitutes a pattern. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d
298, 304 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Parness, 503

F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
201. A.B.A. Report, supra note 31, at 70, quoted in Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3289 (Powell, J., dissenting). Moreover, while Justice Powell fears that the Court has read the statute so

broadly as to effectively preclude lower courts from adopting a narrow view of what constitutes

"pattern," Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3290, there is nothing in the majority opinion to indicate as
much. In contrast, the Court seems to be inviting the lower courts as well as Congress to focus
on the pattern requirement in considering alternative ways to restrict civil RICO's scope. See

id. at 3287.
202.

Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3286-87; id. at 3289-90 (Powell, J., dissenting).

203.

Id. at 3289 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting A.B.A. Report, supra note 31, at 71-

204.

Id. at 3290 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing A.B.A. Report, supra note 31, at 193-

72).

208).
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ment is consistent with the statute's legislative intent and is, on its
face, an attractive way to limit the statute's reach. It is questionable,
however, whether the application of such a narrow definition would
have much practical effect in limiting the number of civil RICO
claims. For example, it would have been difficult for the Second Circuit to utilize the narrow definition of the pattern requirement, proposed by the ABA as a basis for dismissing the civil RICO claims
brought by Sedima. The preparation of the false purchase orders,
invoices, and credit memoranda in Sedima20 5 were acts that (1) were
related to each other as part of the overall effort to defraud the joint
venture; (2) were part of a common scheme to defraud the joint venture; and (3) although occurring over a defined and limited period of
time, there was at least "some sort of continuity" between these acts.
Other so-called "outrageous" uses of civil RICO 20 6 would also satisfy this "narrow" definition of pattern.
Nevertheless, a definition of "pattern" requiring multiple acts
occurring in two or more separate criminal episodes could lead to a
weeding out of some of the more tenuous claims brought under the
statute. 20 7 Such a construction of the pattern requirement would enable courts, for example, to dismiss claims alleging that the "pattern
of racketeering activity" merely consists of multilple mailings in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud. This would serve the spirit as
well as the letter of the law, much more than any of the artificial
requirements that courts previously attempted to impose on civil
RICO.
205. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 484.
206. Id. at 487. See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus. Inc., No. 83-1608, slip op.
at 3 n.l (8th Cir. Aug. 7, 1985) (on remand).
207. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 31, at 207-08; Northern Trust Bank v. Inryco, Inc.,
No. 84 C 2077 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 1985) (two mailings in furtherance of an ongoing kickback

scheme do not constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity"); Professional Assets Management, Inc, v. Penn Square Bank, No. Civ. 82-1357-A, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Oki. Aug. 30, 1985)

(preparation of audit report, although consisting of many constituent acts, was "single unified
transaction," not constituting pattern). See also Teleprompter of Erie, Inc. v. Erie, 537 F.
Supp. 6, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (multiple bribes occurring during the course of a single fun-

draiser do not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity); United States v. Moeller, 402 F.
Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975). In Moeller the court noted that "[tlhe common sense interpretation of the word 'pattern' implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes, that are at
least somewhat separated in time and place, yet still sufficiently related by purpose to demonstrate a continuity of activity." Id. The court, however, felt bound by the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 441-42 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419

U.S. 1105 (1975), to find the existence of a pattern where the predicate acts occurred in the
course of a single criminal episode. Id.
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B. The Burden of Proof
Another open question is the proper burden of proof in a civil
RICO action. Since Congress did not specifically provide for a particular standard of proof in civil RICO actions, it is up to the courts
to resolve this issue. While the Sedima majority opinion can be read
to sanction the use of the typical preponderance standard in civil
RICO actions, the Supreme Court expressly left the question

open. 08 A strong argument can be made that civil RICO is, in fact,
a quasi-criminal statute, and that a higher burden of proof is called
for. While it is not possible to impose a reasonable doubt standard
on civil RICO plaintiffs, 20 9 it may very well be possible to impose
an intermediate standard, i.e., proof by "clear and convincing
evidence."
A preponderance of the evidence standard is used in most civil
litigation, which generally involves a monetary dispute between private parties.210 Nevertheless, a higher standard of proof may be justified in a civil RICO action. While civil RICO claims involve monetary disputes, the statute provides for much more than simple

compensation for a quantifiable loss. It also provides for treble damages, which are punitive in nature because they do more than compensate a prevailing plaintiff for the actual loss caused by the defendant's wrongdoing. 2 '
The mere fact that RICO provides for treble damages is proba208. 105 S. Ct. at 3283. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983);
Comment, Sedima v. Imrex: Civil Immunity For Unprosecuted RICO Violators?, 85 COL L.
REV. 419, 442 (1985). Most courts have concluded that a plaintiff need only prove the elements of a civil RICO claim by a mere preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., Eaby v.
Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 133-34 (E.D. Pa. 1983). Some commentators have advocated
the imposition of a higher standard of proof as one way to limit civil RICO. Strafer, Massumi
& Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling," 19 Am. CRIM. L. REV.
655, 715-17 (1982); Comment, 85 COL. L. REV. at 440-48. Cf. Matz, Determining the Standard of Proof in Lawsuits Brought Under RICO, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 10, 1983, at 21, col. 1
(concluding that the Supreme Court would probably apply a preponderance standard).
209. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is only mandated where the state seeks to restrain
a defendant's liberty or impose criminal sanctions. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64
(1970); United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37, 47-50 (1914). Civil RICO does not seek to do
either. The fact that other sections of RICO call for the imposition of criminal penalties for
criminal violations of § 1962, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1963, does not alter this result. See United
States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975);
Regan, 232 U.S. at 48-50.
210. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).
211. See Sedima, 741 F.2d at 500 n.49. See also Vuitton S.A. v. Spencer Handbags
Corp., Nos. 85-7066, 7094 (2d Cir. June 26, 1985) ("punitive treble damages" provision contained in Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 is not to be applied retroactively because to
do so would raise a potential ex post facto problem).
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bly not sufficient to justify an enhanced standard of proof. 2 2 However, in civil cases involving allegations of fraud or other quasi-criminal activity, an intermediate standard, requiring proof of guilt by
clear and convincing evidence, may be imposed. 21a The rationale for
raising the standard of proof in such cases is based on the recognition that the interests at stake are "more substantial than mere loss
of money. ' 21 4 Such additional interests include the stigmatization or
injury to one's reputation which can arise out of civil liability in
these contexts.21 5
In addition, courts generally apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to claims of common law fraud.21 6 The fact that, but
for the use of the mails or wires, the elements of the mail and wire
fraud predicate offenses are essentially similar to those of common
law fraud claims,21 7 militates in favor of applying an intermediate
standard to those predicate acts.218 Moreover, the other offenses enumerated in section 1961(1) all involve some kind of quasi-criminal
behavior.21 9 Therefore, it is appropriate to require a plaintiff to prove
the predicate offenses of racketeering by "clear and convincing"
212. Although treble damages are awarded under the antitrust laws, a preponderance
standard applies to antitrust claims. See Ramsey v. UMW, 401 U.S. 302, 307-11 (1971);
Matz, supra note 208, at 21, col. 1.But cf. Comment, supra note 208, at 433 n.218.
213. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
214. Id.
215. Id. The possibility of "stigmatization" has been consistently used by the courts to
justify imposing a higher standard of proof. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967)
(possible stigmatization accompanying finding of delinquency requires additional procedural
safeguards); Note, Criminal Law - Enforcing Criminal Laws Through Civil Proceedings:
Section 1964 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1970), 53 TEx.
L. RE V. 1055, 1061 (1975). Cf., Sedima, 741 F.2d at 508 (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting) (stigmatization from civil RICO liability "a bit overstated"). Nevertheless, it could be argued that an
intermediate standard is appropriate only in proceedings involving the loss of some tangible
right, Ie., the loss of liberty, because of the due process implications of such proceedings. See,
e.g., Stantosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (in order to terminate rights of natural
parents, state must support allegations of permanent neglect by clear and convincing evidence); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 423-33 (due process requires that the state prove the
basis for involuntary committment by clear and convincing evidence). See also Comment,
supra note 208, at 441-42.
216. See Comment, supra note 208, at 441.
217. Id. at 444.
218. The fact that a preponderance standard is applicable in actions under Rule lOb-5
of the Securities and Exchange Act, Herman and MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375
(1983), does not preclude imposing an intermediate standard in RICO cases alleging securities
fraud as a predicate act. Rule lob-5 neither provides for treble damages in a private action nor
attorney's fees. Furthermore, liability under Rule lOb-5 does not have the stigma which arguably attaches to liability under RICO.
219. See supra note 28.
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evidence.220
Such a requirement would go a long way toward limiting RICO
liability to only the most egregious cases of civil RICO violations. It
would also provide increased procedural protection to a RICO defendant. It would not, in the process, serve to emasculate the statute as
an effective remedy as would the standing requirements previously
sought to be imposed by the courts.
Conclusion
By rejecting the Second Circuit's restrictive interpretation of
section 1964(c), the Court demonstrated that it will continue to defer to the plain language of a statute unless there is an explicit mandate to the contrary. The Sedima decision clearly indicates that this
policy will be pursued even where a statute has been applied in situations that were not contemplated by Congress.221
The Court went even further by declaring that "RICO is to be
read broadly. '222 This pronouncement will undoubtedly enable victimized consumers, stockholders, and borrowers to make a significant
dent in the economic armor of those enterprises engaged in illegal
activities. It also creates the possibility of frivolous and vexatious litigation brought to force a quick settlement with an organization
faced with the prospect of paying treble damages and attorneys' fees.
Nevertheless, the Court intimated that there may be other ways to
limit RICO, including the formulation of a narrow definition of what
constitutes a "pattern of racketeering activity." Under the existing
statutory scheme the practical effect of any such limitations may be
minimal.
Until now Congress has done nothing to limit the scope of
RICO. In the wake of Sedima, it is up to Congress to decide
whether or not RICO should be limited and, if so, by what means.223
220. See Comment, supra note 208, at 445-46 (advocating requiring proof of all of the
elements of a violation of § 1964(c) by clear and convincing evidence). Since the predicate acts
are actually the quasi-criminal activity, and the RICO violation consists of the commission of
those acts in specified circumstances, it is more appropriate to require proof by clear and
convincing evidence of only the predicate acts.
221. See Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.

222.

Id. at 3286.

223. Id. at 3287. Any "defect" in the statute "is inherent in the statute as written, and
its correction must lie with Congress." Id. Congress has begun to consider ways to limit RICO.
On July 10, 1985, Representative Frederick Boucher (D. Va.) introduced a bill that would
require that a defendant be "convicted of racketeering activity or of a violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1962" before a civil suit could be brought. H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rac.
H5442 (1985). See 54 U.S.L.W. 2059 (July 23, 1985). In addition, on July 29, 1985, Senator
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Hopefully, any such restrictions will accommodate the need to limit
abuse of the statute without limiting the effectiveness of RICO as a
weapon against systematic racketeering activity.

Orrin Hatch (R. Utah) introduced a bill, the Civil RICO Amendments Act of 1985, S. REP.
No. 1521, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S10285 (1985), which is intended to "clarify
the scope of civil remedies under section 1964(c)." 131 CONG. REC. S10287 (daily ed. July 29,
1985) (statement of Sen. Hatch). This bill would (1) require private plaintiffs suing under
section 1964(c) to prove injury separate from injury caused by the predicate acts alone; (2)
require that at least one of the predicate offenses be an act other than mail, wire, or securities
fraud; and (3) allow judges to award attorney's fees to defendants in frivolous RICO actions.
Id. at S10287-88.
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